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On July 7, 2011 the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (IFSWF) released a report on IFSWF Members’ Experience 
in  the  Application  of  the  Santiago  Principles.  The  report  is  a 
self-assessment  of  the  voluntary  compliance  of  21  member 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) with the Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices of SWFs, issued in October 2008. We 
commend the IFSWF for undertaking the surveys on which the 
report is based, for the later decision to publish the results, and 
for the detail included in the report. However, as with many 
self-assessments, the report has some flaws. The principal flaw 
is that the characterization of the extent of compliance with the 
Santiago Principles is exaggerated. 
The IFSWF report says that 95 percent (404 of 426 re- 
sponses) of members’ practices are fully or partially consistent 
with  the  Santiago  Principles.  But  the  number  of  potential 
responses is 504–24 principles for 21 funds. The IFSWF re- 
port  drops  nonresponses  from  both  the  numerator  and  the 
denominator. Including nonresponses as noncompliance would 
reduce  the  compliance  percentage  to  80.  Giving  only  half 
credit for partial compliance would further reduce the figure to   
78 percent.1 Some of the Santiago Principles may not be appli-
cable for all funds, but it is unreasonable to assume that is the 
case for all 78 of the missing observations. For example, two 
funds provided no response regarding their legal framework 
(principle 1). This looks like noncompliance to us.2 
The IFSWF report also does not disclose the compliance 
rates for each of the individual SWFs that participated in the 
self-assessment. Based on our research, some of the 21 funds 
have substantially lower rates of compliance than others. Table 1 
presents a summary of compliance with the Santiago Principles 
for each of the 21 SWFs covered by the IFSWF report based on 
the most recent SWF Scoreboard (Truman 2010 and 2011). The 
summary is based on results for 16 of the 24 Santiago Principles 
where there is an intersection between the Principles and the 
33 elements in the Truman SWF Scoreboard.3 The average for 
the 21 funds on the Scoreboard is 72 percent compliance, and 
the comparable average from the IFSWF report is 80 percent 
compliance, which is higher but broadly comparable with the 
1. We have followed these conventions in our comparisons. 
2. In addition, the IFSWF report generally says “all funds” when it means all 
funds that reported. The report also says “most funds” when it means a major-
ity of reporting funds. For example, only 11 of the 21 funds reported that they 
have fully or partially reviewed their implementation of the Santiago Principles 
(principle 24).
3. Where a Santiago Principle overlaps with more than one of the elements in 
the SWF Scoreboard, we used a simple average of the Scoreboard elements. 
See appendix 6A in Truman (2010) for the correspondence that we used. 
Truman 2010 and 2011 score Chile’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 
and its Pension Reserve Fund separately while the IFSWF report treats the two 
SWFs as one entity. Therefore, we averaged the two scores.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 4   A u g u s t   2 0 1 1
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Scoreboard assessment.4 This comparability of the results of the 
two assessments gives us confidence that the compliance rates 
for the individual funds shown in table 1 are broadly consistent 
with the rates of compliance for the 21 funds that participated 
in the IFSWF self-assessment.
As shown in table 1, on the basis of the SWF Scoreboard, 
five SWFs score above 90 and eight score above 80, but two 
score in the 60s, two in the 40s, and one each in the 20s and 
10s. The IFSWF report obscures this variation in compliance. 
SWFs are not homogenous, as the IFSWF report is at pains to 
point out, but their heterogeneity cannot explain the extent of 
dispersion in results for individual funds shown in table 1.
The IFSWF report does provide information on the number 
of SWFs that have implemented each principle since the adop-
4. For the full set of 24 Santiago Principles, the average compliance rate in the 
IFSWF report is 78 percent.
tion of the Santiago Principles in 2008. On average, one SWF 
has done so for each of the sixteen principles on which table 1 is 
based. In other words, the average score has been raised by about 
6 percentage points since the fall of 2008. This figure is somewhat 
lower than the average increase for the 33 SWFs included in the 
SWF Scoreboard over the longer period since the Scoreboard was 
first released in 2007—15 percentage points (Truman 2011).
These  shortcomings  in  presentation  obscure  the  results 
presented  in  the  IFSWF  report,  but  the  report  remains  an 
important and valuable document as long as it is read carefully. 
For example, it allows one to examine the extent of compliance 
with each of the Santiago Principles. Such an examination is 
summarized in table 2.
Table 2 is divided into two parts: the 16 principles where 
there  is  an  intersection  with  the  33  elements  in  the  SWF 
Scoreboard and the eight principles where there is no inter-




Abu Dhabi (UAE) Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  78
Australia Future Fund  93
Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund 72
Bahrain  Mumtalakat Holding Company  28
Botswana  Pula Fund  64
Canada  Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund  73
Chile  Economic and Social Stabilization Fund and Pension Reserve Fund   66
China  China Investment Corporation  74
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund  95
Korea Korea Investment Corporation  79
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority  75
Mexico  Mexico Oil Income Stabilization Fund  40
New Zealand Superannuation Fund  97
Norway  Government Pension Fund  98
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority  18
Russia  Reserve Fund and National Wealth Fund  47
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 81
Singapore Temasek Holdings 84
Timor Leste  Petroleum Fund  73
Trinidad and Tobago  Heritage and Stabilization Fund  81
United States Alaska Permanent Fund  94
Average: 
SWF Scoreboard  72
IFSWF Report  80
Source: Truman 2010, Truman 2011, IFSWF 2011.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 4   A u g u s t   2 0 1 1
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section. In the first part of the table, we present a comparison 
of compliance (principle by principle) based on the IFSWF 
report and based on the SWF Scoreboard. The last column 
provides the difference between the rates of compliance in the 
two assessments. The first part of the table is further divided 
into three subsections corresponding to the grouping of the 
Santiago Principles in the IFSWF report’s three categories: legal 
framework, objectives, and coordination with macroeconomic 







Legal Framework, Objectives, and Coordination with Macroeconomic Policies 
1. Legal framework 88 87 1
2. Policy purpose  88 98 –10
3. Integrated with  macroeconomic policies 55 80 –25
4. Source of funds and use of earnings 86 79 7
Subtotal  79 86 –7
Institutional Framework and Governance Structure 
6. Division of roles  88 88 0
7. Role of government  88 88 0
8. Role of governing body 88 90 –2
9. Decisions made by managers 86 76 10
11. Annual report 88 88 0
12. Audit 83 82 1
13. Internal ethical standards  76 51 25
17. Financial information disclosure  83 76 7
Subtotal  85 80 5
Investment and Risk Management Framework
18. Investment policies 79 57 22
19. Investment principles  74 24 50
21. Corporate responsibility policy 52 31 21
22. Risk management framework 71 57 14
Subtotal  69 42 27
Total (16 principles)  80 72 8
Non–overlapping Principles 
5. Statistical data  83
10. Accountability framework  90
14. Third party procedures 71
15. Disclosure in host countries  74
16. Governance framework  86
20. Avoid conflict of interest  64
23. Investment reporting standards 76




Total (24 principles)  78
IFSWF = International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds
Source: Truman 2010, Truman 2011, IFSWF 2011.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 4   A u g u s t   2 0 1 1
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policies; institutional framework and governance structure; and 
investment and risk management framework. 
With respect to four principles covering legal frameworks 
and related matters, the SWF Scoreboard rates the compliance of 
the 21 SWFs somewhat higher than does the IFSWF report—86 
percent versus 79 percent. In particular, the Scoreboard assess-
ment is that the operations of the SWFs are more completely 
integrated with macroeconomic policies (principle 3) and that 
the policy purpose of the SWF is more clearly defined (principle 
2) than is revealed by the IFSWF self-assessments.
On the other hand, with respect to the eight principles 
regarding institutional frameworks and governance, the IFSWF 
report on average records a moderately higher level of compli-
ance than does the SWF Scoreboard—85 percent versus 80 per-
cent. The principal discrepancy is with respect to internal ethical 
standards (principle 13)—25 percentage points. It is likely that 
the reason for this discrepancy is that the Santiago Principles do 
not recommend that an SWF’s internal ethical standards, if any, 
be publically disclosed; the recommendation is only that they be 
made known to the members of the governing bodies, manage-
ment, and staff. Therefore, citizens of the country with the SWF 
and citizens in other countries have no way to know if the SWF 
is in compliance with this principle. This is a weakness in the 
Santiago Principles. The SWF Scoreboard, in contrast, is based 
on publicly available information that is regularly released.
With  respect  to  investment  decisions  being  made  by 
fund managers (principle 9), the IFSWF report also records 
a higher level of compliance (86 percent) than does the SWF 
Scoreboard  (76  percent).  This  is  an  area  where  one  would 
expect some positive bias in any self-assessment. 
A much smaller discrepancy is on the public disclosure 
of  relevant  financial  information  (principle  17).  The  SWF 
Scoreboard includes four separate elements that are identified 
with this single principle: investment returns, categories, loca-
tions, and use of benchmarks. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that one finds a discrepancy in the two assessments. Moreover, 
to its credit, the IFSWF report contains a frank discussion 
of the variation in practices with respect to the disclosure of 
investment policies by the different SWFs.
In the category of SWF investment and risk management 
frameworks, the differences between the two ratings of compli-
ance with each of the four principles are substantially larger and 
uniformly in the direction of a higher rating of compliance in 
the IFSWF report than on the SWF Scoreboard—69 percent 
versus 42 percent on average for the category as a whole. One 
possible explanation for these differences is that the four prin-
ciples in this category are inherently more subjective. However, 
it is noteworthy that the average level of compliance in this 
category of the IFSWF self-assessment is substantially lower 
than in the other two categories in both ratings.  
The  principal  reason  why  there  is  no  correspondence 
between eight of the Santiago Principles and elements in the 
SWF Scoreboard is that there is no way to verify compliance 
with most of those principles other than via a statement by the 
SWF that it complies. (In a few cases, the relevant principle has 
little operational content.) On the other hand, the average score 
on these eight principles is only 74, which is somewhat lower 
than the average score for the other 16 principles. This suggests 
little bias in these self-assessments. Moreover, if principle 24 
(self-initiated reviews of Santiago Principles implementation), 
is excluded, the average of the remaining seven principles would 
be 77, even closer to the average for the other 16 principles. 
Principle 24 is important and would have been included in 
the SWF Scoreboard except that at the time that Truman was 
writing there was only a limited record of SWFs following this 
principle.5 The IFSWF report itself notes that only four SWFs 
had published their self-assessments as of the time that report 
was completed, though three other funds intend to do so.6
Our broad conclusion with respect to the 16 principles 
where one can compare the results in the IFSWF report and on 
the SWF Scoreboard is that the ranking of compliance is gener-
ally consistent even though not identical. In other words, our 
assessment is that the IFSWF report is substantive and admi-
rable even though we regard it as deficient in some respects.
Moreover, the IFSWF report makes several useful contri-
butions to understanding SWFs.
First, the report is quite frank about some of the issues 
that arise with respect to the interpretation of its results, for 
example regarding the application of the principles on invest-
ment policies and on nonfinancial restrictions on SWF invest-
ment decisions.
5. Those reviews presumably in the future will be informed by the surveys 
that were used to prepare the IFSWF report, which no doubt was one of the 
motivations for the surveys and the report, but the self-initiated reviews might 
be expected to go into even greater depth and specificity.
6. The four SWFs that have published their self-assessments are those of New 
Zealand, Australia, Norway and Azerbaijan. The three SWFs that the IFSWF 
report says plan to publish are those of China, Chile, and Timor-Leste. The 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority also has published a reasonably complete 
report of its compliance with the Santiago Principles, but that fact is not 
included in the IFSWF report.
Our assessment is that the IFSWF report is 
substantive and admirable even though we 
regard it as deficient in some respects.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 4   A u g u s t   2 0 1 1
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Second, the report contains a section on transparency. The 
authors are careful to argue that the objective of the Santiago 
Principles is not to increase SWF transparency. Nevertheless, the 
results of the surveys on which the IFSWF report is based clearly 
indicate that most of the SWFs value transparency for domestic 
reasons and for the positive impact on their reputations.
Third,  the  authors  acknowledge,  though  unfortunately 
only in a footnote, that the IFSWF has a problem with the 
SWFs  of  the  three  countries  (Equatorial  Guinea,  Iran,  and 
Libya) that are members of the IFSWF but did not participate 
in the surveys. The report states that the IFSWF “will review 
its membership and discuss with its inactive members about 
their membership and endorsement of the Santiago Principles 
before the next meeting of the IFSWF in Mexico in May 2012.” 
Inactive memberships are a problem for a self-regulatory body 
such as the IFSWF because such behavior reflects adversely on 
the other members and on the credibility of the forum as an 
institution. In addition, we hope the IFSWF will be successful 
in persuading some of the seven SWFs with total assets of more 
than $25 billion to participate in the IFSWF and to endorse 
the Santiago Principles.7 We also hope that this report leads 
7. The seven SWFs are those of Algeria, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, 
Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and two funds in the United Arab Emirates.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. This publication is part of the overall programs 
of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily reflect the views of individual 
members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
to refinements in the Santiago Principles, which is one of the 
report’s stated purposes.
On the whole, we agree with the IFSWF report that it 
“represents a solid, initial step toward a better understanding of 
the IFSWF and of the Santiago Principles, by our stakeholders 
and by interested parties in general.” Well done, but not perfect.
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